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This paper, part of the symposium on ‘Theorizing International Organizations 
Law’, discusses the work (and a little of the life and influence) of H.G. Schermers, 
arguably the leading functionalist international organizations lawyer of the post-
war era. The paper discusses how Schermers’ work solidified and consolidated 
functionalism, and unwitting laid bare its ‘achilles heel’. Confronted with the 
growing popularity of human rights and himself keenly devoted to human rights, 
Schermers faced a dilemma when the possible responsibility of international 
organizations for human rights violations came up – a dilemma his functionalism 
was unable to solve. Therewith, zooming in on Schermers’ handling of the 
dilemma confirms that functionalist international organizations law is unable to 
address the responsibility of international organizations towards third parties. 
International organizations law will need to find different theoretical resources 
in order to come to terms with responsibility. 
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For lawyers working within and with international organizations, Leiden 
University must have seemed the center of the universe for a decade or two, 
roughly from the late 1970s until the late 1990s. It owed this status 
predominantly to one man, the formidable Henry G. (Hein) Schermers. 
Schermers is one of the representatives of the second wave of international 
organizations law scholarship1 and, arguably, the leading post-war 
representative of the school of thought that has come to be known as 
functionalism – a school which suggests that organizations are built around their 
functions, and since those functions and international cooperation generally are 
inherently benign, it follows that the work of organizations (i.e., the performance 
of their functions) ought to be stimulated and facilitated by the law of 
international organizations. While functionalism can mean different things in 
different contexts, in the law of international organizations it stands for the 
broad proposition that the functioning of those creatures should not be impeded; 
instead, the law should help organizations to prosper. Over the last few decades 
it has transpired, however, that this entails that it is difficult to hold 
organizations to account. 
Functionalism was not a new idea when Schermers started his work on 
international organizations; its antecedents can be traced from a throwaway 
remark by Georg Jellinek in the late nineteenth century, via the writings of 
Americans such as Paul Reinsch and Frank Sayre and the advisory opinions of 
the PCIJ, to the classic Reparation for Injuries opinion of the International Court 
of Justice, handed down a few years before Schermers started his academic 
career.2 Nor was Schermers the only functionalist to work on international 
organizations law in the period following Reparation for Injuries: Derek Bowett, 
quite possibly the author of the first comprehensive textbook in English3, and 
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, quite possibly the author of the first comprehensive 
textbook in German4, were amongst his main colleagues and contenders. Yet, 
Bowett never really focused on international organizations law per se – he was a 
generalist who also wrote books on islands in international law, and on the use 
of force, and who appeared many times as counsel before the International Court 
of Justice; international organizations law was something he did ‘on the side’, so 
to speak. Moreover, his main work on international organizations is arguably 
more in the nature of a discussion of individual organizations and their organs 
than a systematic overview of the legally salient aspects – the latter comprised 
less than 25 per cent of the text of the fourth edition, the last edition Bowett 
himself prepared.5 And Seidl-Hohenveldern, writing mostly in German, never 
reached as large an audience as Schermers did. 
                                                        
1 See Klabbers, ’The Life and Times of the Law of International Organizations’, 70 
Nordic Journal of International Law (2001) 287. 
2 For this trajectory, see Klabbers, ’The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of 
International Organizations Law’, 26 European Journal of International Law 
(2015) 9. 
3 D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (1962). 
4 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Das Recht der internationalen Organisationen 
einschliesslich der supranationalen Gemeinschaften (1967). 
5 D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 4th edn. (1982). 
The purpose of the present paper is to set out Schermers’ brand of functionalism, 
and investigate both its theoretical credentials and its influence. For me, at least, 
studying international organizations law in the Netherlands in the 1980s meant 
studying Schermers, and studying Schermers meant studying functionalism, 
even though the term itself probably never made its way to the classroom. The 
compulsory literature when I was an undergraduate student included Bowett’s 
book, then in its fourth edition (it was used for its descriptions of individual 
organizations rather than for its discussion of general issues such as personality, 
powers or privileges – the latter were not part of the assigned readings), and the 
Dutch synoptic version of Schermers’ International Institutional Law,6 a 
condensed work of some 300 pages with all the charm of a telephone directory – 
very useful, very informative, but not very reader-friendly.7 
This paper is structured around a fundamental tension, representing the two 
souls beating in Schermers’ chest: his faith in international organizations on the 
one hand, and his faith in human rights on the other hand. What to do when the 
two come together, in situations when international organizations are accused of 
violating human rights? My contention will be that Schermers never managed to 
reconcile his two souls properly – he found pragmatic ways out, to be sure, but 
never on the level of principle. What is more, the theory central to his faith in 
international organizations, functionalism, did not, and does not, allow a 
principled way out; it cannot (as will be explained below) simultaneously do 
justice to both the autonomy of international organizations and the protection of 
third parties. As will be shown, all possible solutions - possible under 
functionalism, that is - boil down to either responsibility sliding off the 
organization towards its member states, or to imagining the international 
organization as something other than an international organization. Hence, the 
study of Schermers’ work reveals one of the fundamental limits of functionalism. 
 
2. Schermers’ Trajectory 
 
                                                        
6 H.G. Schermers, Inleiding tot het internationale institutionele recht, 2nd edn. 
((1985). 
7 In addition - our teacher at the time, Joost van den Dool, deserves credit for 
trying hard - we had to go through Basic Facts of the UN and a number of further 
materials, ranging from newspapers clippings to the Brandt report. These 
focused not on the legal set-up of organizations, but on their substantive 
activities. 
Hein Schermers was born in the Dutch town of Epe in 1928, and thus 
experienced the Second World War as a teenager.8 He went on to study law in 
Leiden, and seamlessly moved on the Dutch Foreign Ministry upon graduation in 
1953. Before moving to the Ministry’s legal service in 1956, his first years (he 
started in 1953) were spent in the Ministry’s department on international 
organizations, where he carried special responsibilities for the work of the 
specialized agencies. Naturally, he developed an interest in international 
organizations, realizing very quickly that these were politically and practically 
relevant vehicles for international cooperation but also that very little general 
information about them was available, and that he was particularly well-placed 
to do something about it. Half a century later he recalled that his role in 
informing Dutch ministries of how the specialized agencies had resolved 
institutional issues ‘gave me a reputation of being expert in the institutional 
questions of the specialized agencies’, and often the ministries ‘asked me to 
participate in their internal discussions about the preferred structure’ of any 
organization they may have been contemplating.9  
His official responsibilities concerning the specialized agencies fell in fertile soil: 
the war must have taught him that states and their sovereignty are up to no 
good, and that there would be merit in reducing their influence. As such, his 
work can be placed against a straightforward and effective normative 
background philosophy, according to which sovereign states were to be 
approached with suspicion. He rarely put it more clearly than in a book review in 
the late 1970s, applauding the focus of the book under review on protection of 
individual rights: ‘We need law for the benefit of men, not of government 
officials. The rights of individuals, including undertakings, are of greater 
importance than the sovereignty of States, which often comes down to the right 
of government officials to act as they please.’10 
International organizations then presented themselves almost naturally as 
benign alternatives to states, all the more so as they lacked sovereignty. The 
incongruence in the thought that nasty states would set up benign organizations 
never seemed to occur to him. Already the first edition of International 
Institutional Law oozes a sentiment, amidst the technicalities, about the necessity 
                                                        
8 Much – though not all - of the biographical data is culled from the brief 
overview listed in the Festschrift dedicated to Schermers: see R. Lawson and M. 
De Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Essays 
in Honour of Henry G. Schermers; Volume 3 (1994), 383. 
9 Schermers, ‘The Birth and Development of International Institutional Law’, 1 
International Organizations Law Review (2004) 5, at 6. 
10 Schermers, reviewing A.G. Toth, ‘Legal Protection of Individuals in the 
European Communities’, 28 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1979), 534, at 534. 
of there being international organizations: ‘The most desirable development’, he 
held, downplaying both state sovereignty and a putative world government, 
would be ‘a development towards a dispersion of powers between local, 
regional, national and supranational authorities.’11 And later editions of the book 
make perfectly clear where his normative sympathies lie. The book is meant, in 
part, to stimulate the practical workings of international organizations, and these 
creatures are important because they can compensate, in international affairs, 
for the absence of central authority.12 
While employed at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Schermers was struck in 
particular – like so many of his generation – by the UN family, and given his 
everyday responsibilities, he quickly decided that international organizations 
formed a suitable topic for a doctoral thesis: how are the specialized agencies set 
up and organized?13 He finalized his thesis in 1957, and therewith was among 
the first post-war scholars to contribute to the study of international 
organization. He would be followed over the next 15 years or so by a veritable 
wave of writings about international organizations law, almost invariably from a 
functionalist perspective.14 Scholars were writing about the treaty-making 
powers of international organizations,15 their law-making powers,16 succession 
                                                        
11 H.G. Schermers, International Institutional Law (1972), 3. 
12 H.G. Schermers and N.M Blokker, International Institutional Law, 3rd edn 
(1995), 7. 
13 H.G. Schermers, De gespecialiseerde organisaties: hun bouw en inrichting 
(1957). 
14 The proverbial exception resides in the work of Seyersted, who adopted a 
more ‘organic’ framework (for want of a better term), e.g. in F. Seyersted, 
Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental organizations: Do Their 
Capacities really depend upon the Conventions Establishing Them? (1963). For a 
discussion of Seyersted’s work and relevance, see Klabbers, ‘On Seyersted and 
His Common Law of International Organizations’, 5 International Organizations 
Law Review 381. 
15 J.W. Schneider, Treaty-making Power of International Organizations (1959); K. 
Zemanek, Das Vertragsrecht der internationalen Organisationen (1957); K. 
Zemanek (ed.), Agreements of International Organizations and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1971); H. Chiu, The Capacity of International 
Organizations to Conclude Treaties (1966). 
16 I. Detter, Law Making by International Organizations (1965). 
between organizations,17 issues of membership,18 financing of organizations,19 
the privileges and immunities of international organizations,20 amendment of 
their constitutions,21, and even the responsibility of international organizations, 
or at least of their member states.22 And much of this embodied a functionalist 
spirit: invariably, organizations were depicted as benign creatures, set up to do 
things that states alone could not (or did not want to) take responsibility for. 
These activities were generally viewed as commendable, as benefitting mankind 
at large, and thus there should be no interference with the work of international 
organizations. Well-nigh all international organizations lawyers of Schermers’ 
generation adopted the same mantras, and understandably so: these were the 
only mantras available at the time, having been developed by an earlier 
generation of scholars, even before the ‘move to institutions’23 took place in 
earnest, and coming out of a World War, they must have seemed quite 
persuasive. 
In 1963 Schermers accepted a chair in the law of international organizations (a 
new chair at the time, as he recalled,24 later also held by Richard Lauwaars, 
Friedl Weiss and Pieter Jan Kuijper) at the University of Amsterdam. It remains 
speculation, but it is not unlikely that he was brought to Amsterdam by Arnold 
Tammes, then the chair of public international law at that University, and himself 
the author of pioneering work on international organizations law, which 
exercised considerable influence on Schermers’ thinking.25 While in Amsterdam, 
                                                        
17 Chiu, ‘Succession in International Organisations’, 14 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1965) 83; Hahn, ‘Continuity in the Law of 
International Organization’, 13 Östereichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 
(1964) 167.  
18 N. Singh, Termination of Membership of International Organisations (1958). 
19 J.D. Singer, Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget 
Process (1961); J.G. Stoessinger et al., Financing the United Nations System 
(1964). 
20 K. Ahluwalia, The Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized 
Agencies of the United Nations and Certain Other International Organizations 
(1964) 
21 R. Zacklin, The Amendment of the Constitutive Instruments of the United Nations 
and Specialized Agencies (1968). 
22 K. Ginther, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit internationaler 
Organisationen gegenüber Drittstaaten (1969). 
23 Kennedy, ’The Move to Institutions’, 8 Cardozo Law Review (1987) 841. 
24 Schermers, Birth and Development, at 6. 
25 A.J.P. Tammes, Hoofdstukken van international organisatie (1951); Tammes, 
’Decisions of International Organizations as a Source of International Law’, 94 
Recueil des Cours (1958/II) 265. Tammes had earlier written his own doctoral 
dissertation (in Dutch) on the Commonwealth, according to his obituary: 
https://www.dwc.knaw.nl/DL/levensberichten/PE00003264.pdf (visited 18 
January 2020). 
Schermers set up the Europa Institute and focused his studies of international 
organizations in part on what was then the EEC – after all, in those days it was 
still common to regard the EEC as an international organization, perhaps 
somewhat different from others but still a recognizable species of the genus. In 
this capacity he wrote his book Judicial Protection in the European Community, 
which lists the legal possibilities for individuals to find relief by seizing the EU’s 
Court in Luxembourg.26 This already indicated that he was not just thinking of 
organizational structures: his second main interest was formed by the position of 
individuals and therewith by human rights law, and for many years he was the 
Dutch member of the then extant European Commission of Human Rights, and it 
is possible to argue that his two main interests came together in his work on 
judicial protection in the EEC.27 
In 1978 he moved from Amsterdam to the University of Leiden, his alma mater, 
where he held a chair in international organizations law until his ‘first’ 
retirement in 1993,28 and became editor in chief of the Common Market Law 
Review, still one of the leading periodicals in the field of EU law. By 1978, he had 
already published the first edition of his general treatise on international 
institutional law, a wonderfully rich and informative overview of pretty much 
everything related to the institutional aspects of international organizations.29 It 
is this book, currently in its sixth edition, co-authored with his successor (and 
former student) Niels Blokker,30 that can be found on the desks of all 
international organizations lawyers, whether practitioners or academics. They 
keep it close at hand, for it is capable of providing at least a beginning of an 
answer to all (or almost all) practical institutional legal questions one can think 
of, and many more one never would have thought of. If books are weapons, then 
International Institutional Law is a nuclear device, setting out a picture of a 
better world, achieved by and through international organizations, and explicitly 
written so as to support their activities. The world of international organizations 
law is very much the world according to Schermers; his influence is only 
                                                        
26 H.G. Schermers, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (1976). The 
book went through seven editions, the most recent being published 
posthumously in 2014. 
27 He also brought these strands together in his contribution to Tammes’ liber 
amicorum, offered at the occasion of the latter’s retirement in 1977. See 
Schermers, ‘Indirect Obligations – Four Questions in Respect of EEC Obligations 
Arising from Rights or Obligations of Others’, in H. Meijers and E.W. Vierdag 
(eds.), Essays on International Law and Relations in Honour of A.J.P. Tammes 
(1977) 260. Schermers left the University of Amsterdam shortly after Tammes’ 
retirement. 
28 Thereafter, he continued for a number of years as the (part time) Van Asbeck 
Professor of Human Rights at Leiden University, finally retiring in 2002. 
29 H.G. Schermers, International Institutional Law (1972). 
30 H.G. Schermers and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law, 6th edn (2018). 
matched by the influence of earlier editions of Oppenheim’s International Law 
treatise within the chancelleries of states.31 
Schermers’ work, both in terms of its quantity and its substance, suggests a 
highly disciplined, systematic scholar, collecting and systematizing knowledge at 
great length and to great depths. Schermers was not known for his critical 
attitude,32 and he may not have been the most influential thinker of his 
generation, but as a scholar of a certain type (careful, systematic, moderate and 
modest) he was unrivaled. 
 
3. Schermers’ Functionalism 
 
Schermers’ functionalism was, in a way, intuitive rather than cerebral. When he 
started his academic career, functionalism was already well in place, having been 
developed in the beginning of the twentieth century by in particular Paul 
Reinsch, a lawyer cum political scientist teaching at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, and later Woodrow Wilson’s ‘minister’ (i.e. ambassador) in China.33 
Reinsch had studied some thirty public international unions in existence at the 
turn of the century, and had noted that they all had in common that their tasks 
could be perceived as technical, or functional: from arranging postal traffic to 
harmonizing weights and measures or railway tracks to combating diseases. 
What is more, they did so at little cost, whether political or financial, and in 
service of the common good: for who could complain about improved 
communications or the eradication of diseases? Best of all, they carried with 
them the promise of universal peace.34 
Reinsch was, to be sure, a child of his time. While he abhorred colonial 
imperialism if it came with territorial conquest, he was nonetheless sensitive to 
the possibilities for organizations, in exercising their functions, to exercise 
domination on behalf of some over others. He was most explicit perhaps in a 
                                                        
31 On Oppenheim and his influence, see M. Garcia-Salmones, The Project of 
Positivism in International Law (2013). 
32 Typical are the words on the opening page of Judicial Protection (and retained 
through various editions, but by now deleted), in which he extols the virtues of 
the CJEU: ’… a detailed description of the Court’s case-law portrays a fine legal 
system that is not susceptible to a great amount of fundamental criticism.’ 
Schermers, Judicial Protection, at 1. 
33 On Reinsch, see N. Pugash, Paul S. Reinsch: Open Door Diplomat in Action 
(1979). 
34 P.S. Reinsch, Public International Unions, Their Work and Organization: A Study 
in International Administrative Law (1911). 
lecture to the Milwaukee Bankers Club in 1906, aiming to sell US membership of 
the Pan-American Union in terms his audience could understand: it would allow 
the US to dominate Latin America just as effectively as colonizing the continent 
would. Moreover, much of his comparative method had been borrowed from his 
earlier works on colonial administration: these were set up as comparisons of 
the experiences of the great colonial powers in their respective colonies, fairly 
systematically and in fairly great depth. Reinsch employed the same comparative 
method to his study of the public unions.35 
Reinsch was followed by Frank Sayre, Woodrow Wilson’s son-in-law and author 
of Experiments in International Administration.36 Sayre’s Experiments largely 
emulated Reinsch’s work, but with one crucial, though at the time largely 
unnoticed, difference. Where Reinsch had (unwittingly, probably) limited his 
studies to organizations devoted to the common good, Sayre was far less 
discriminate – or more overtly indiscriminate, perhaps. For him, well-nigh all 
forms of international cooperation qualified as international organizations, 
whether devoted to the public good or explicitly devoted to the endorsement or 
protection of highly particular interests. Thus, river commissions protecting 
western traders in China qualified as international organizations (regardless of 
whether China would participate), as did police missions in unruly Balkan places 
where commercial interests were threatened. As a result, the conception of the 
common good that still informed and underpinned Reinsch’s work, however 
vaguely, became excruciatingly thin: the mere circumstance of international 
cooperation came to represent the common good, regardless of how and for 
whom the international cooperation was put in place.37 
Hence, when Schermers began his career, there was already a functionalist 
framework in place, which he absorbed lock, stock and barrel, mixing Reinsch’s 
undoubted idealism with the thinner version represented by Sayre. If Schermers’ 
doctoral dissertation encompassed Reinschian entities (the specialized 
agencies), International Institutional Law embraced a Sayrean broad notion of 
international organizations, capturing not just the World Health Organization, 
UNESCO and the like, but also commodity organizations or interest groups such 
as the International Wool Study Group or the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
                                                        
35 See further Klabbers, ’The Emergence of Functionalism in International 
Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations’, 25 European Journal of International 
Law (2014) 645. 
36 F.B. Sayre, Experiments in International Administration (1919). 
37 See further Klabbers, ‘The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of International 
Organizations Law’, 26 European Journal of International Law (2015) 9. 
It would seem at first sight that Schermers added little to the theory of 
functionalism. This is both accurate and somewhat deceptive. It is accurate in 
that Schermers was rarely tempted to make grand theoretical claims, and what 
he (and perhaps Blokker more than Schermers38) added drew inspiration  from a 
short piece by Virally, written when Schermers’ own thought-system was 
already firmly in place.39 Schermers seems mostly to have been quietly 
systematizing. But it is precisely here where the deception resides: Schermers’ 
systematic comparative method became its own theory, a functionalism within 
functionalism.  
A comparative approach has always informed the study of international 
organizations. Both Reinsch and Sayre had employed a rough-and-tumble 
comparative method, looking at various entities to see what they had in common, 
and liberally drawing things together. Sayre in particular was not very 
systematic, distinguishing between three basic categories of organizations (or 
organs) on the basis of the rather fluid criterion of the power they exercised, 
while leaving it unclear what he meant by ‘power’. Thus, one group consisted of 
organizations ‘with little or no real power of control’, presumably over their 
member states, since he listed the Universal Postal Union as an example. A 
second group had power, though not so much over member states but rather 
over ‘local situations’, while his third group consisted of two organizations with 
power over member states: the International Sugar Commission, and the 
International Rhine Commission (which could have fitted the second group as 
well, presumably). This was the academic equivalent of comparing apples, 
organs, and bicycles, with it remaining uncertain whether some fruits were 
apples or oranges, or both perhaps.  
Schermers, by contrast, proved far more systematic in his comparativism. 
Schermers systematically and almost relentlessly compared institutions not in 
accordance with some fluid criterion, but on the basis of functional criteria: who 
can join? How does one join? How does membership terminate? Can members be 
expelled? How are organs set up? Do they need to be representative? Do 
elections play a role? Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. In effect, within the broader 
                                                        
38 The references to Virally’s work have been retained in the fifth edition of 
International Institutional Law, published and prepared without Schermers’ 
involvement. 
39 See Virally, ’La notion de fonction dans la théorie de l’organisation 
internationale’, in S. Bastid et al. (eds.), Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau: La 
communauté internationale (1974) 277. Virally’s piece was published well after 
the first edition of International Institutional Law, whereas M. Virally, 
L’organisation mondiale (1972), on which the article draws, was first published 
in the same year as International Institutional Law.  
theory of functionalism (concerning the functioning of the organization at large), 
Schermers broke down the human experience in small functional bits and pieces.  
This added to the theory, however unobtrusively perhaps. Take, e.g., his 
discussion on withdrawal of member states (rather topical in times of Brexit). 
Withdrawal generally means a weakening of the organization, and can possibly 
even ‘overthrow’40 the organization in its entirety, especially if the organization 
is a supranational one. If a constitution contains a withdrawal clause, then this 
needs to be followed. By where such a clause is absent, things are less obvious. 
Schermers, as early as 1972, went through a discussion of the UN, the WHO and 
UNESCO and their practices, and concluded that international law (in the form of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) as well as the practice of 
organizations did not accept a right of unilateral withdrawal in the absence of a 
clause to that effect.41 
Innocuous as all this seems, it did have one important side-effect: where the 
masters of the treaty had omitted creating any rules, mastery of the same 
constitutive instrument was taken over by the organization. Effectively, the 
absence of any provision in the constitutional design could be remedied by 
organizational decision, typically decision by the competent organ (whichever 
this turned out to be, as few constituent instruments tend to be specific in 
endowing specific organs with precisely delineated competences). By zooming in 
on the function of withdrawal and how it would affect the functioning of the 
organization, the ball had shifted from the member states’ court to the 
organization’s court: since withdrawal would generally have the potential to 
undermine the organization’s functioning, it ought not to be stimulated. The 
functional analysis of withdrawal joined forces with the functional analysis of the 
organization – and together they created an impregnable bulwark.  
Indeed, Schermers also considerably refined the functionalist approach and 
seemed, for a while at least, capable of reconciling apology and utopia, as his 
discussion of withdrawal illustrates. Organizations were creatures of states, 
created by states to serve certain purposes; hence, all member states had an 
interest in seeing the functions performed – this, after all, is why they joined, ex 
hypothesi. As a result, the interest of the organization dovetailed neatly with the 
interests of each and every member state, with the exception of the member 
                                                        
40 Schermers, International Institutional Law, at 44. He added presciently that 
‘the transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational organization by all 
Members should not be undone by a unilateral act of one Member.’ 
41 The sixth edition structures the analysis differently. It posits the Vienna 
Convention’s rule, and then ruefully suggests that if states seriously wish to 
withdraw, the ‘other members are in fact powerless to prevent’ this from 
occurring; thereupon it lists a number of arguments that withdrawing states can 
invoke. See Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law, at 117.  
state that was about to withdraw. Whatever the organization would decide 
would thus be in the national interest of the remaining member states, and since 
it was more practicable to speak with one voice, why not leave things to the 
organization? Again then, in Schermers’ work the interest of the member states 
joined forces with those of the organization – and, again, together they created 
an impregnable bulwark. 
To summarize then, Schermers exercised a considerable influence on the 
development of functionalism, managing to support it both on the level of ideas 
and under reference to practice and politics. And the key to all this resided in 
particular in his comparative approach, which unlocked the various positions 
and suggested how, at the end of the day, all noses pointed in the same direction. 
Looking back on his earlier career, Schermers himself viewed comparativism as 
something of an ‘infant industry’ analogy. The creation of new organizations 
after the war meant that there ‘was much room for comparison.’ Comparative 
work, however, could slowly be displaced by proper coordination between 
existing organizations, and the focus of international institutional law (the 
discipline, but perhaps also the book) could therewith shift to something else. 
Here too, however, functionalism was never far away: the law could (and 
perhaps should) move ‘in the direction of an efficient and successfully 
functioning of each organization.’42 
 
4. Schermers’ Human Rights Problem 
 
If the likes of Reinsch and Sayre could develop functionalism in rather 
uncomplicated manner, it was because theirs was a conceptually uncomplicated 
time. International law was made between states, and meant to affect only states. 
Effects on anyone else were always mediated, and were mediated by those same 
states, while the PCIJ’s first musings on directly effective international law were 
still a decade or so in the future.43 This state-centric orientation was the 
conceptual framework in place, and it assisted functionalism enormously, for it 
meant that international organizations could be portrayed as derived from states 
and as still only touching states – the legal dynamics of international 
organizations could be fully captured by pointing to their member states: these 
member states created organizations, and these member states were the 
                                                        
42 Schermers, Birth and Development, at 7. 
43 See Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, advisory opinion, [1928] Publ. PCIJ, 
Series B, no. 15. 
addressees of the activities of international organizations. The conceptual 
universe, it seemed, was neatly closed off.  
This picture may not have been particularly plausible: surely, whom else are ILO 
conventions to affect but individual workers?44 Nonetheless, the picture was as 
real as any picture can get: these were dualist times, and dualism, as Triepel 
reminded his contemporaries,45 was essentially based on the empirical 
observation that international law and domestic law operated in separate 
spheres, and would not come in contact with each other.46 What happened in 
international law stayed in international law. 
This now was a luxury that was no longer quite as forcefully present when 
Schermers wrote. When Schermers was an undergraduate student in Leiden, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights saw the light, as did the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The human rights revolution may have kicked off 
slowly and only reached its peak during the 1970s, as has been argued,47 but 
nonetheless it came to affect the way Schermers had to think about international 
organizations. And the problem that transpired was this. Under functionalism, 
international organizations were supposed to contribute to the common good, 
and pave the way towards universal peace. They are, to the functionalist, 
essentially benign creatures, and cannot be otherwise: any criticism meets with a 
Teflon-like response. Should they aim to do wrong, the ultra vires doctrine kicks 
in to correct them: they are not to step outside their assigned powers and 
functions, and these, after all, cannot encompass anything bad. Should they be set 
up for nefarious purposes, then general international law kicks in, finding fault 
with the states who set up a creature for nefarious purposes – or, alternatively, 
nefarious organizations are ‘defined away’, pigeonholed as not truly constituting 
international organizations.48 And should they nonetheless do wrong, it cannot 
be their own fault – it must be the fault of the member states failing to control 
them. Hence, on a conceptual level, under functionalism the international 
organization literally can do no wrong – any wrong done by an organization is 
always, and by definition, a wrong done by the member states, and it is no 
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coincidence that early studies of the responsibility of international organizations 
quickly morph into studies on the responsibility of member states.49 
This rosy picture was no longer sustainable by the 1970s, but Schermers 
struggled long and hard to come to terms with it – he struggled generally with 
issues of responsibility or accountability of international organizations.50 The 
first edition of International Institutional Law devoted less than half a page (out 
of more than 750 pages) to issues of responsibility, and even then, he hardly 
seemed willing to recognize that organizations could intentionally do wrong. The 
first example he listed (as a hypothetical) of an instance of responsibility related 
to the possible crashing of a satellite. Yet this is one of the few instances where 
international law assigns strict liability to the entity sending the satellite in orbit, 
and holds that fault or culpa are irrelevant.51 Hence, this still is a far cry from 
acknowledging that organizations can actually do wrong: they can be responsible 
under a strict liability scheme, but that is no admission of wrongfulness. His 
second example was different in nature but, but he managed to give a highly arid 
overview of the responsibility incurred and accepted by the UN following its 
operations in the Congo. These ‘caused considerable injury’, as he put it, but he 
could not, it seems, get himself to concede that the UN may have done something 
wrong here – the formulation is passive, as if something wrong had happened to 
the UN.52 
Schermers, as a member of the European Commission of Human Rights and with 
considerable EU law expertise, knew better than most that issues of 
accountability could not forever be avoided. Still, he formulated his reluctance to 
discuss accountability in no uncertain terms. Setting up organs such as an 
inspection panel might be useful, he thought, so as to strengthen the 
responsibility of the organization itself. But this is where it should stop: an 
external accountability mechanism seemed not to occur to him (inspection 
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panels are, after all, internal to the organization53), and to hold states 
individually accountable for the acts of organizations ‘would endanger the 
functioning of the organization, as it may move states to abstain from supporting 
action which they could consider useful.’54   
During the 1970s, his EU law expertise sensitized him to two developments that 
problematized the idyllic functionalist picture. First, while the EU treaties had 
envisaged a period of transition from the start, this formally came to an end by 
1970, and the EU started to exercise some powers by exclusivity, thus effectively 
replacing its member states in governmental action. And if national authorities 
have the potential to violate human rights, so too do supranational authorities 
like the EU when performing tasks they have come to call their own. Importantly, 
moreover, the exclusive nature of the powers implied that the member states 
could no longer be blamed – they may have delegated tasks at some earlier point 
in time, but have lost control thereof; the problem resides with the execution, not 
the tasks, and execution had become the exclusive province of the EU. Second, 
the European Commission of Human Rights received several allegations 
concerning human rights violations by international organizations, in particular 
the EU. Hence, somehow Schermers was forced to reconcile his human rights 
sensibilities with his functionalism, and this proved no easy task; in fact, on the 
level of principle he was unable to do so. 
Various options presented themselves, but none of them could be reconciled 
with functionalism. A first option, advocated by Schermers in the 1970s, was for 
human rights somehow to become incorporated into EU law, and he suggested 
that to some extent the case-law of the CJEU had already developed in that 
direction.55 Indeed, his faith in the CJEU was limitless: the fact that, by the early 
1990s, the EU was not bound by the European Convention created a gap in legal 
protection of the individual, but the gap was mostly ‘theoretical’ and small at any 
rate, ‘as the Community judiciary will annul any Community act which infringes 
general principles of law, which normally include human rights.’56 This would do 
little to alleviate the general issue though: it would be akin to an organization 
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setting its own rules, without ever broaching the principled question whether it 
could be held responsible for breaches of external standards.  
A second option, endorsed by Schermers in the 1990s, was for the EU to accede 
to the European Convention.57 This would not solve all problems (the human 
rights catalogue is broader than just the European Convention) and, more 
importantly perhaps from a theoretical perspective, would effectively suggest 
that the EU was no longer an international organization but something a lot 
closer to a state. Schermers would perhaps have been happy to draw that 
conclusion, but it would not have rescued functionalism – it would have retained 
the tension between functionalism and human rights. 
A third possible option was to continue to blame the member states, and this too 
was resorted to whenever possible. This had become implausible whenever the 
EU was exercising exclusive powers, but in other domains was still an option. 
Thus, the organization of elections to the European Parliament was viewed as a 
matter for the member states rather than the EU, with the result being that in 
Matthews, the British authorities rather than the EU were accused of depriving 
certain individuals of their right to vote.58 More generally, as Schermers’ student 
Moshe Hirsch would write, member states can be held responsible for 
organizational wrongdoings in two ways: either secondary responsibility (the 
claimant can proceed against the member states after an initial claim against the 
organization has failed) or indirect responsibility (the claimant can proceed 
against member states in order to force them to control their organization 
properly, e.g. by making sufficient funds available for compensation).59  
Either way then, it transpires that Schermers (and with him functionalism) had 
great difficulties in somehow bringing international organizations and 
accountability together. Either the transgressing organization turned out to be 
not a proper organization but something closer to a state, or the transgressing 
organization can deflect complaints towards its member states. It is, indeed, no 
accident that the most popular solution of the human rights dilemma of 
international organizations is the doctrine of ‘equivalent protection’, formulated 
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authoritatively by the European Court of Human Rights during the 1990s and 
adopted by the literature as a sensible pragmatic solution.60 Under this doctrine, 
organizations are supposed to take internal steps to guarantee human rights, on 
the presumption that those internal steps offer a level of protection equivalent to 
the protection state parties to the Convention are supposed to offer. 
Schermers’ thinking on matters of accountability and human rights was strongly 
influenced by his functionalist orientation. As noted, he was reluctant to see that 
states would stop doing things together out of fear for unintended legal 
consequences, but the connection exists on a deeper level as well. It is notable 
how much he expected from the EU’s accession to the ECHR, and he explained 
this by pointing out that if this were to happen, then the Community ‘would be 
an independent party … with its obligations concerning matters other than the 
obligations of the Member States, namely Community acts, and with the Member 
States responsible for domestic acts.’ EU accession, so he conceded, might create 
some institutional hassles (can the EU have its own Strasbourg judge, e.g.), but as 
far as the treaty obligations were concerned, EU accession ‘would cause no 
problems.’61   
Underlying this is a conception of powers of international organizations as 
‘communicating barrels’:62 the member state’s loss is the organization’s gain, and 
vice versa. The normative universe, in this picture, can neatly – and exhaustively -
be divided: powers (and thus responsibility) rest either with member states or 
with the organization; there are neither overlaps here nor grey areas. And this, in 
turn, is characteristic for functionalism, which starts from the proposition that 
member states delegate functions to an organization, and endow their 
organization with the powers necessary to give effect to that function. Logically, 
it would seem that this exhausts the possibilities: a power is either granted to the 
organization or retained by the member states. Tertium non datur.  
Neat and elegant as this conception is, it may questioned how realistic it is. It has 
been suggested, e.g., that in exercising their proper domestic powers, EU 
member states can nevertheless end up in conflict with EU law. The EU has, e.g., 
nothing to say about abortion, but it does have something to say about free 
movement of services. Consequently, offering abortion services across national 
boundaries may offend national authorities, but possibly be protected by EU law 
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and its fundamental freedoms.63 And from here, it is but a small step to 
appreciate that thinking solely in terms of legal competences may be a 
functionalist trait, but might create a distorted analysis.64 Authority, even if 
based on an initial division of competences, tends to be more fluid than 
functionalism presumes – it tends to be more ‘liquid’.65  
 
5. Schermers’ Influence 
 
In the Dutch academic setting of the 1980s and 1990s, it was decidedly 
uncommon for leading law professors to groom doctoral students in their own 
specializations and create something of a school – usually, PhD students could 
follow their own interests and see where their intuitions would take them. It 
might be sensible to find a supervisor knowledgeable of the field of study, but the 
idea of a joint project, run by a professor and carried out by several PhD 
students, was unheard of. All the more remarkable is it, then, that Schermers 
supervised a handful of doctoral dissertations on international organizations law 
over the period of a decade, all of them (in varying degrees, to be sure) 
addressing central concepts in institutional law, and all of them (in varying 
degrees, to be sure) grappling with functionalism in one way or another. This did 
not add up to a coherent study group: the topics were a bit too far removed from 
each other. But still, the works all ooze an interest in, and affection for, 
functionalism, and all can be said to take on themes that had occupied Schermers 
for some time. This is not to say that a ‘Schermers school’ was created, whether 
by design or by default; Schermers also supervised doctoral students working in 
human rights law pur sang, or in EU law pur sang, without particular reference 
to functionalism. But still, a handful of his doctoral students worked on 
international organizations and did so in a recognizable functionalist vein. 
The first of these, though perhaps the least occupied with central aspects of 
functionalist thought, was Niels Blokker’s thesis,66 co-supervised by Schermers, 
and addressing questions of normative architecture. Blokker studied the position 
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of the multi-fiber agreement within the international trading system, which was 
in those days still based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
This was an important study on an important question: how can a regime 
ostensibly devoted to the liberalization of trade nonetheless accommodate a 
special position for a particular industrial sector, and one where in particular the 
wealthier nations feel threatened by possible competition from poorer 
countries? In functionalist terms: if the function of the GATT is to stimulate free 
trade, then how can an instrument such as the multi-fiber agreement be 
justified? After all, it seems to take much away from the formal function of the 
GATT. Perhaps surprisingly given Blokker’s subsequent career path, the main 
orientation of his study was towards international economic law, with Blokker 
influenced by the teachings of Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, a former 
Commission civil servant turned law professor at Utrecht University and 
sometime advocate-general at the CJEU.67 Still, the thrust of VerLoren van 
Themaat’s thoughts and those of Schermers were highly compatible: VerLoren 
van Themaat saw international economic law mostly in functional terms, with 
large chunks of it taken care of by international organizations.68 
The works by Peter Bekker69 and Sam Muller were more obviously functionalist 
in inspiration. Bekker aimed to provide a legal justification for the powers and 
privileges and immunities of international organizations, and found those 
precisely in the notion of function. With brilliant brevity, he observed that 
organizations ‘shall be entitled to (no more than) what is strictly necessary for 
the exercise of its functions in the fulfilment of its purposes’.70  
Muller71 zoomed in on a particular class of relations of organizations, namely 
those with their home states. Ironically perhaps, the theoretical relevance of this 
class of agreements went somewhat unnoticed: if organizations can be said to 
have any inherent powers at all (i.e. powers not deriving from their functions but 
simply from their existence and nature), it would be the power to conclude a 
headquarters agreement. This, however, remained largely unexplored, with 
Muller aiming to explain and discuss the substantive contents of headquarters 
agreements in terms of functions. 
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The final two doctoral dissertations in this group switched to concerns that are 
currently rather in vogue. Moshe Hirsch was one of the first, following the 
International Tin Council collapse,  to address the responsibility of international 
organizations and their member states under international law following the 
International Tin Council collapse.73 Noting, as others had done, how difficult it 
would be to hold organizations directly responsible, the work quickly shifts 
gears to discussing the responsibility of member states for acts or omissions 
attributable to the organization. If the member states refuse to make funds 
available or otherwise impede the organization from doing what it should do, it 
is they who incur responsibility, either indirectly or secondarily.74 
Finally, Rick Lawson75 wrote a very substantial and subtle work (in Dutch, alas) 
on the relationship between the EU and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, highlighting what was to become the unsatisfied vanishing point of 
Schermers’ functionalism. Lawson, following a suggestion repeatedly made 
elsewhere by Schermers,76 suggests that one practical way out (although not 
very gratifying on the level of principle) may be for the EU to accede to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. But the bolder suggestion was for 
Lawson to advocate that if there were a situation involving an alleged human 
rights violation by an international organization, the human right just had to be 
prioritized. Where Schermers would still prioritize the organization – witness his 
expressed discomfort with any accountability discussion – Lawson 
unapologetically went the other way, viewing organizations as having been 
created by states, and those states, therefore, could be held accountable if things 
were to go wrong.77  
The influence of Schermers as doctoral supervisor has remained by and large 
limited, it seems, to Leiden. Blokker has remained throughout his professional 
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life affiliated with that University. While he also served the Dutch Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs for a while, he retained a part-time chair in Leiden, and upon 
returning from the Ministry is a full-time academic. He occupies, fittingly, the 
Schermers chair, set up with funds dedicated by Schermers himself. Blokker is 
best known for his work on international organizations law; while arguably of 
the five doctoral students he was the least obviously functionalist, he is now the 
one most associated with Schermers’ tradition. 
Lawson is also still affiliated with Leiden University, having recently served as 
dean of the law school. Following his doctoral thesis, he has worked mostly on 
human rights law. This includes the connecting points with institutional law, but 
is most assuredly not limited to it. Bekker and Hirsch are both also academics, 
although Bekker only returned to academia after a lengthy spell in private 
practice. He is currently a law professor in Dundee, dealing mostly with energy 
and investment matters. Hirsch has become a law professor at Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, and also has left institutional law by and large behind – 
currently he is perhaps best known for his pioneering work in bringing law and 
sociology together. Muller, finally, has not completely severed his academic ties, 
but has been more closely involved in international legal practice and diplomacy, 
for instance through spells with UNWRA, the Yugoslavia Tribunal and 
International Criminal Court. He has founded and directs the Hague Institute for 
the Innovation of Law (HiiL), a policy-oriented think-tank annex funding agency 
based in The Hague and aiming to stimulate justice and the rule of law globally, 
and is chairing the Dutch branch of the World Wildlife Fund. 
Surprisingly, then, none of the five has moved on to positions within 
international organizations or Foreign Ministries (with the temporary 
exceptions of Blokker and Muller). Schermers’ influence therewith stems largely 
from elsewhere, even if it cannot be excluded that a huge amount of former 
master’s students have gone on to the national or international civil service.78 
The most likely source of Schermers’ influence then resides in his voluminous 
academic writings, and in particular in the treatise, setting out a functional 
approach to international organizations while often (not unlike Molière’s 
bourgeois gentilhomme) remaining unaware of the theoretical relevance of his 
work – something that curiously adds to its charm and persuasiveness. 
 
6. To Conclude 
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Hein Schermers did not invent functionalism, but he did a great deal to 
consolidate it, and helped to ensure that functionalism grew to be a true 
paradigm, even in the limited sense of that (oft-abused) term that Kuhn gave it.79 
He did so in a number of ways. First, rather obviously, he did so by ‘tightening 
up’ the theory and methodology of functionalism. Compare Schermers to earlier 
functionalist writers such as Reinsch and Sayre, and what immediately catches 
the eye is the systematic nature of his work: he could lay a legitimate claim to 
being considered the Linnaeus of international organizations law, presenting 
fine-grained taxonomies and detailed analyses. If he did not invent 
functionalism, he improved on it, and consolidated both its normative and 
explanatory appeal. 
He did so in part by supervising a group of talented young scholars and, more 
generally, did a lot to nurture gifted students. One of the things for which he 
became known in the Netherlands was the founding of an association of 
students, at some point in the late 1980s, under the name Mordenate College – 
with Mordenate being a rendition of ‘more than eight’. He invited students whose 
grades (on a scale of 1-10) tended to be eight or higher and brought these 
together. Mordenate College still exists as a student association. 80 
And then there is the magnum opus. His treatise International Institutional Law 
has gone through six editions (four during his lifetime), and has been 
enormously influential. It has almost doubled in size over the almost half century 
of its existence, and while the materials have regularly been updated, the tone 
was firmly set already with the first edition, in 1972. International organizations 
were forces for good, despite being created by sovereign states, and their 
functioning should not be impeded. If ever a mantra for international 
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